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Whither Now Namibia?*
JOHN F. MURPHY**
Superficially, it would be hard for anyone to imagine Namibia, or as
it was previously called, South West Africa,' as a focal point of interna-
tional tension. The 318,261 square miles of the territory-a total area
about equal to that of Italy and France-is small in terms of the total
African continent, and most of this land is largely desolate desert and
mountains. Its location, far from the United States and the major trading
nations of Europe, and its population of only 749,000 people (including
90,000 whites)2 seem to diminish further its international significance.
*I am indebted to Jonathan M. Landers of the University of Kansas Law School
faculty for his many helpful suggestions on an earlier draft of this article. Work on
this article was also materially assisted by a summer research grant from the University
of Kansas. Responsibility for the views expressed, however, is my own.
"Member of the Kansas and Washington, D.C. Bars. Professor of Law, University
of Kansas. B.A. 1959, LL.B. 1962, Cornell University.
1. On June 12, 1968, the United Nations General Assembly adopted Resolution 2372
changing the name of South West Africa to Namibia. 22 U.N. GAOR Supp. 16 A, at 1,
U.N. Doc. A/6716 Add. 1 (1968). South Africa has refused to recognize the validity
of this name change and, in its advisory opinion of June 21, 1971, the International
Court of Justice referred to the Territory as "Namibia (South West Africa)." Advisory
Opinion on Legal Consequences for states of the Continued Presence of South Africa
in Namibia (South West Africa) Notwithstanding Security Councl IResolution 276
(1970), [1971] I.C.J. 16 [hereinafter referred to as [1971] I.C.J. Rep. 16]. In order to
avoid clumsy terminology, "Namibia" shall be used throughout this article, except
when reference is made to the history of the territory in which event the term "South
West Africa" may be employed.
2. N.Y. Times, June 9, 1971, at 10, col. 1.
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These peripheral attributes, however, belie the importance of Namibia.
Its location-bounded by Angola on the north, Zambia on the northeast,
South Africa on the east and south, and the Atlantic ocean on the west-
is of strategic importance, both to South Africa and to revolution-minded
peoples in the "third world." Its potential mineral wealth invites ex-
ploitation by the mineral-thirsty nations of the developed world.8 Of per-
haps greater importance, Namibia is a test of the ability of South Africa
to impose Apartheid upon another nation, and raises profound questions
of the efficacy of the international legal process. Consequently, for the
last twenty years Namibia has been a cause for heated debate in the
United Nations and other international forums. These disagreements
have sharply exacerbated tensions between the "third world" states of
Africa, Asia and Latin America and the United States and Europe, have
inflamed tensions between whites and blacks in the southern part of the
African continent, and have created a situation fraught with the potential
for violence.
The International Court of Justice has been the forum for many con-
frontations between South Africa and world community over Namibia.
The latest result of these legal skirmishes in the Court was the advisory
opinion of June 21, 1971.4 Previously, the Court had considered Namibia
on five occasions since 1950 and had rendered two judgmentsu and three
advisory opinions6 covering a variety of issues pertaining to the territory.
Nevertheless, in spite of this prodigious expenditure of judicial time and
effort, the problem appears no nearer resolution than it was prior to
institution of the first proceedings before the Court in 1950.
In its opinion of June 21, 1971, the Court advised the Security Council,
by thirteen votes to two that:7 (1) South Africa's continued presence in
Namibia is illegal; and therefore (2) South Africa is under an obligation
3. Namibia's mineral resources include diamonds, copper, lead, lead-zinc, uranium,
and possibly oil. See United Nations Council on Namibia, Report, 26 U.N. GAOR,
Supp. 24, at 30, U.N. Doc. A/8424 (1971).
4. [1971] I.C.J. 16.
5. South West Africa Cases (Ethiopia v. South Africa; Liberia v. South Africa), Pre-
liminary Objections, [1962] I.CJ. 819 [hereinafter cited as SWA Cases 1962]; South
West Africa Cases, Second Phase, Judgment, [1966] I.C.J. 6 [hereinafter cited as SWA
Cases 1966].
6. Advisory Opinion on International Status of South West Africa, [1950] I.CJ. 128:
Advisory Opinion on Voting Procedure on Questions Relating to Reports and Petitions
Concerning the Territory of South West Africa, [1955] I.C.J. 67; and Advisory Opinion
on Admissibility of Hearings of Petitioners by the Committee on South West Africa,
[1956] I.C.J. 23.
7. [1971] I.C.J. 16, at 46.
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to withdraw its administration from Namibia immediately and to end
its occupation of the territory. The Court further advised the Council,
by eleven votes to four that:8 (1) member states of the United Nations
are obliged to recognize that South Africa's presence in Namibia, and
its acts on behalf of or concerning Namibia, are illegal and invalid, and
they must refrain from any relations with South Africa implying recogni-
tion of, or lending support to, South Africa's presence in Namibia; and
(2) states not members of the United Nations are obliged to lend assis-
tance to United Nations action taken with respect to Namibia.
Since the Court's opinion is advisory only and not directly binding on
South Africa, 9 and South Africa has categorically rejected the opinion,
10
the Namibia question has now, in effect, been remanded" to the United
Nations for a political solution. In considering the Namibia question,
and various options for United Nations action, the General Assembly and
the Security Council will have to take into account the advisory opinions
and judgments of the International Court of Justice, as well as the re-
sultant legal situation existing with regard to the territory.
After a brief discussion of historical background, this article will
evaluate the advisory opinion of June 21, 1971, and set it in historical
and contemporary perspective in order to highlight some of the primary
problems facing the United Nations in its deliberations on Namibia. The
article will then consider alternative courses of action available to the
United Nations and the world community in light of judgments and
opinions of the International Court of Justice, Charter principles, polit-
ical feasibility and the perceived interests of all parties to the dispute.
Lastly, it will suggest a new approach to the problem, with a view to
ending the present impasse between South Africa and the United Nations
and furthering the cause of human rights in Namibia.
8. Id.
9. On advisory opinions, see art. 96 of the U.N. Charter and I.C.J. STAT. arts. 65-68.
Also, see 2 S. ROSENNE, THE LAiv AND PRACTICE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT 651-757
(1965); Rosenne, On the Non-Use of the Advisory Competence of the International
Court of Justice, 1963 BRT. Y.B. INT'L L. 1; Sloan, Advisory Jurisdiction of the Inter-
national Court of Justice, 38 CALIF. L. REV. 830 (1950); M. HuDsON, THE PmRiANENT
COURT OF INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE 1922-1942, at 483-524 (1943); Goodrich, The Nature of
the Advisory Opinions of the Permanent Court of International Justice, 32 Am. J.
INT'L L. 738 (1938).
10. N.Y. Times, June 22, 1971, at 1, col. 6.
11. The term and the concept are derived from Landis, The South West Africa Cases:
Remand to the United Nations, 52 CORNELL L. REv. 627 (1967).
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I
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
Prior to World War I, South West Africa (as Namibia was then called)
was a German protectorate.' 2 During the war it was conquered and oc-
cupied by South African forces. When the war ended, South Africa sur-
rendered the territory to the Allies, with the expectation that it would
later annex the territory in accordance with secret wartime agreements.
But President Wilson's policy of "no annexations" prevailed at the Paris
Peace Conference, and the mandates system of the League of Nations
was established. Under this system, "advanced nations" were to govern
former colonies and territories whose inhabitants were considered not yet
able to govern themselves, in accordance with the principle that "the
well-being and development of such peoples form a sacred trust of civiliza-
tion. . . .. 13 The mandates were to be designated as "A," "B" or "C" de-
pending on "the state of the development of the people, the geographical
situation of the territory, its economic conditions and other similar cir-
cumstances." 4 "C" mandates, which included South West Africa and the
Pacific Islands, were regarded as "best administered under the laws of
the mandatory as integral portions of its territory" because of such fac-
tors as sparse population, small size, remoteness of the territory from "the
centers of civilization" or their geographical contiguity to the territory
of the mandatory.15 South Africa was to serve as mandatory over South
West Africa and administer the territory under the terms set forth in
article 22 of the Covenant of the League and in the Mandate for South
West Africa.' 6
12. For general historical accounts of South West Africa and of the dispute between
South Africa and the United Nations regarding the status of South West Africa, see,
e.g., Applicants' Memorials, SWA Cases, 1-4 I.C.J. Pleadings (1960); I. GOLDBLATr, THE
MANDATED TERRITORY OF SOUTH WEsT AFRIcA IN RELATION TO THE UNITED NATIONS 21-67
(1961).
13. LEAGUE OF NATIONS COVENANT art. 22, para. 1. 1 M. HUDSON, INTERNATIONAL
LEGISLATION (1931).
14. Id. para. 3.
15. Id. para. 6.
16. The Mandate for South West Africa provided in pertinent part:
Article 2
The Mandatory shall have full power of administration and legislation over
the territory ... as an integral portion of the Union of South Africa, and may
apply the laws of the Union of South Africa to the territory, subject to such
local modifications as circumstances may require.
The Mandatory shall promote to the utmost the material and moral well-
being and the social progress of the inhabitants of the territory....
[Vol. 6: 1
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At the end of World War II, and upon dissolution of the League, all
mandated territories except South West Africa either became indepen-
dent17 or were placed under the trusteeship system of the United Na-
tions.18 In 1946, South Africa, with the alleged concurrence of the
inhabitants of the territory, announced its intention to annex South
West Africa, and asked the General Assembly for its consent to this
action. The General Assembly rejected this request as being incompatible
with the Covenant and the mandate as well as the wishes of the people
of the territory. Instead it urged South Africa to transfer its mandate to
the trusteeship system.' 9
South Africa, however, refused to put the territory under trusteeship.
In 1947, it did submit one annual report-which was severely criticized-
to the General Assembly, but maintained it was under no obligation to
do so. Then in 1948 the Nationalist government came into power in
Pretoria and established the policy of Apartheid.20 Thereafter, Apartheid
was gradually extended to South West Africa, and the Nationalists took
a number of steps which the General Assembly regarded as equivalent
to de facto annexation of the territory.
Article 4
The military training of the natives, otherwise than for purposes of internal
police and local defense of the territory, shall be prohibited. Furthermore,
no military or naval bases shall be established or fortifications erected in the
territory.
Article 6
The Mandatory shall make to the Council of the League of Nations an an-
nual report to the satisfaction of the Council, containing full information with
regard to the territory, and indicating the measures taken to carry out the
obligations assumed under Articles 2, 3, 4, and 5.
Article 7
The consent of the Council of the League of Nations is required for any
modification of the terms of the present Mandate.
The Mandatory agrees that, if any dispute whatever should arise between
the Mandatory and another Member of the League of Nations relating to the
interpretation of the application of the provisions of the Mandate, such dis-
pute, if it cannot be settled by negotiation, shall be submitted to the Perma-
nent Court of International Justice ....
HUDSON, supra note 13, at 57.
On the mandates system of the League generally, see, e.g., H.D. HALL, MANDATES,
DEPENDFN .CI, AND TRUSTEESHIP (1948); Hales, The Creation and Application of the
Mandate System, 25 TRANSAcr. GROT. Soc'Y 185, 204 (1939); Q. WIorr, MANDATES UN-
DER THE LEAGUE or NATIONS (1930), Potter, Origin of the System of Mandates Under
the League of Nations, 16 AM. Pot. Sci. REv. 563 (1922).
17. The former "A" mandates all became independent.
18. See U.N. CHARTmR arts. 75-91.
19. G.A. Res. 65, 1 U.N. GAOR 1323-27, U.N. Doc. a/64/ Add. I, at 123 (1947).
20. On Apartheid generally, see, e.g., Baker, Human Rights in South Africa, 11 How.
LJ. 549 (1965); Landis, South African Apartheid Legislation, 71 YALE L.J. 1, 437 (1961,
1962); and Comment, Apartheid Legislation: the Suppression of Communism Act, 5
CoLum. J. TRANsNAT'L L. 281 (1966).
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Prior to 1948, South Africa had grudgingly accepted the notion that
the United Nations at least had an "interest" in South West Africa, which
was somehow derived from the League. This is most evident in its sub-
mission of the request for annexation to the United Nations. Beginning
in 1948, however, South Africa shifted its position and denied any
United Nations' interest in or authority over South West Africa. It con-
tended that the South West African mandate had lapsed upon dissolution
of the League, and that South Africa therefore had no obligation to
report to, or consult with, the United Nations on its administration of
the territory. The United Nations insisted that the mandate remained
in full force and effect, that the United Nations had succeeded to the
supervisory functions of the League, and that South Africa's refusal to
cooperate with the United Nations on South West Africa was a violation
of its international obligation. Faced with these irreconcilable positions,
the General Assembly requested the International Court of Justice to
render an advisory opinion on the territory's legal status. In 1950, the
Court advised the Assembly that:
21
(1) South West Africa remained a territory under mandate (unanimously).
(2) The international status of the Territory could be modified by the South
African government only with the consent of the United Nations (unani-
mously).
(3) "ifihe Union... continues to have the international obligations stated in
Article 22 of the Covenant... and in the mandate ... as well as the obli-
gation to transmit petitions . . . the supervisory functions to be exercised
by the United Nations, to which the annual reports and the petitions are
to be submitted .. " (12-2)22
(4) The trusteeship provisions of the Charter were available for South West
Africa (unanimously), but South Africa was under no obligation to place
the Territory under trusteeship (8-6).
In 1955 and 1956, the Court issued two supplementary advisory opinions
on procedural matters, the former advising that the United Nations could
adhere to Charter-prescribed procedures in voting on South West African
questions and did not have to apply the unanimity rule followed by the
Council of the League,23 and the later advising that the United Nations
could grant oral hearings to petitioners from the territory.2 4
South Africa not only refused to accept any of the Court's advisory
opinions on South West Africa, but also rejected United Nations resolu-
21. Advisory Opinion on International Status of South West Africa, supra note 6.
22. Id. at 143-44.
23. Advisory Opinion on South West Africa Voting Procedure, supra note 6.
24. Advisory Opinion on Admissibility of Hearings of Petitioners by the Committee
on South West Africa, supra note 6.
[Vol. 6: 1
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tions on the subject. Similarly, United Nations efforts during the twelve-
year period ending in 1959 failed to resolve the problem; the Assembly
thereupon invited25 legally qualified states26 to undertake contentious
proceedings against South Africa in the International Court of Justice
to obtain a "binding"27 resolution of the issues outstanding between
United Nations members and the Union.
Ethiopia and Liberia responded to the Assembly's call. In 1960, they
filed applications with the Court contending South Africa's imposition of
Apartheid upon South West Africa violated its obligation in article 2 of
the mandate to "promote to the utmost the material and moral well-
being and the social progress of the inhabitants of the territory. .. ."
South Africa in reply filed preliminary objections, alleging that the
applicants had no jurisdiction over the subject matter. By an eight to
seven vote, the Court, in December, 1962, dismissed all preliminary ob-
jections and found that it was competent to hear the dispute on the
merits
28
However, when the Court considered the case on the "merits" in July,
1966, it in effect reversed the earlier decision and held that Ethiopia and
Liberia had no "legal right or interest . in the subject-matter of the
present claims .... ,,29 i.e., in South Africa's observance of its obligations
under the mandate. The vote was again eight to seven, but this time the
President of the Court, Sir Percy Spender, broke a tie by casting his vote
in favor of dismissal of the case.30 In support of its decision, the Court
25. G. A. Res. 1361, 14 U.N. GAOR Supp. 16 at 29, U.N. Doc. A/4354 (1959).
26. By the terms of Article 7 of the mandate, it was clear that only states which
were members of the League of Nations would have any chance of challenging South
Africa's administration of the territory before the International Court of Justice. See
Mandate for South West Africa, supra note 16.
27. Under art. 94(2) of the Charter a judgment in a contentious case is enforceable
by reference to the Security Council.
28. SWA Cases 1962.
29. SWA Cases 1966 at 51, § 99.
30. It should be noted that the inconsistency between the Court's 1966 judgment and
its 1962 decision may be explained by the intervening change in the composition of the
bench. Judges Badawi and Bustamente, who had both voted against South Africa's pre-
liminary objections, did not participate in the proceedings because of poor health
(Judge Badawi died during the pendency of the proceedings). Judge Zafrulla Khan
was disqualified on the ground that he had been named (but had not sat as) judge
ad hoc by the Applicants before he was elected to the Court. Judge Khan subsequently
indicated that he had not disqualified himself voluntarily but had been informed by
Sir Percy Spender that the Court had decided he should not participate. Pakistani
Press Release, citing interview given by Judge Khan to M. Nasim Ahmed, London
correspondent of Dawn, on July 25, 1966. For a view that the applicants would not
necessarily have won easily if the three judges had participated, see D'Amato, Legal and
Political Strategies of the South West Africa Litigation, 4 L. iN TRANs. Q. 8, 41 (1967).
1972]
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distinguished between "conduct" provisions and "special interest" provi-
sions of mandates. It found that "conduct" provisions defined the man-
datory's obligations toward the inhabitants of the territory while "special
interest" provisions conferred rights regarding the territory directly upon
members of the League as individual states, or in favor of their nationals.
The South West Africa dispute, according to the Court, related only to
the conduct provisions of the mandate and these provisions did not con-
fer any legal right or interest in individual members of the League, as
differentiated from residents of the territory itself.31 The Court responded
to the charge that it was reversing its 1962 decision by suggesting that
the earlier ruling was limited to a holding that the applicants were mem-
bers of the League and that the dispute did concern a provision of the
mandate. The decision did not, determined the Court, examine the ques-
tion of standing. This, the Court concluded, was a question which had
been left for judgment at the merits stage.32
In his closely reasoned dissent, Judge Jessup pointed out that the stand-
ing argument had not even been advanced by South Africa in its final sub-
missions to the Court,38 and that both parties assumed this issue had been
settled by the 1962 decision.84 More importantly, by deciding that Ethiopia
and Liberia had no "standing," the Court avoided deciding what most
people regarded as the two primary issues in the case-the accountability
of South Africa to the United Nations for its administration of the
mandate, and the compatibility of its application of Apartheid to the
territory with its obligations under the mandate and international law.85
The 1966 judgment of the Court has been exhaustively and critically
31. It is interesting to note that the only "special interest" provision of the South
West Africa mandate would appear to be art. 5, which requires the mandatory to allow
missionaries and nationals of members of the League into the Territory for purposes
of pursuing their calling.
32. For a concise yet thorough summary of this part of the Court's opinion, see
Landis, supra note 11, at 655. Also, see Dugard, The South West Africa Cases, Second
Phase, 1966, 83 S. Ar. L.J. 429, 446 (1966).
33. SWA Cases 1966, at 328 (Jessup, J., dissenting).
34. See Gross, The South West Africa Case: What Happened? 45 FoREiGN Arr. 36,
44 (1966); Dugard, supra note 32, at 446.
35. In their memorials, applicants relied on two contentions to attack South Africa's
application of Apartheid to the territory. They argued, first, that it violated a general
standard or norm of international law and, second, that it resulted in below standard
treatment for the "natives" contrary to South Africa's obligation under art. 2 of the
mandate to promote the well-being and racial progress of the inhabitants of the ter-
ritory to the utmost. In the course of the oral proceedings, apparently to induce the
Court to reject a suggestion by South Africa that it visit the territory itself to examine
conditions there, the applicants largely abandoned their second contention and relied
instead on an international norm or standard of non-discrimination as the basis of
their arguments. See D'Amato, supra note 30, at 22-36.
[Vol. 6: 1
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discussed elsewhere.38 For present purposes, it is sufficient to note that
the effect of the judgment was primarily threefold. First, it had no effect
on the substantive issues the applicants tried to raise; second, it signi-
ficantly undermined confidence in the impartiality and judicial ability
of the Court; and third, it generated considerable emotional and highly
political activity in the United Nations.
The Afro-Asian bloc reacted to the Court's judgment by taking greater
care in subsequent elections of judges to secure a Court more favorably
disposed to Afro-Asian interests. In the 1966 elections, for example, three
out of a total of five judges elected were from the Afro-Asian bloc,8 7 and
another judge from Africa was elected in the nineteen sixty-nine
election.38 Although the results of these elections may be partially de-
fended as efforts to effectuate article 9 of the Court's Statute3 9 and to
bring about a more equitable representation in the Court of various polit-
ical and social systems, 40 in some instances insufficient attention was paid
to the qualifications of the individual judges elected,41 as required by
article 2 of the Court's Statute.42 Moreover, some candidates were rejected
primarily or even solely on the basis of their nationality.43
36. See, e.g., D'Amato, supra note 30; Dugard, supra note 32; Murphy, The South
West Africa Judgment: A Study in Justiciability, 5 DUQUESNE L. REv. 477 (1966-67);
Landis, supra note 11; Gross, sutra note 34; Higgins, The International Court and
South West Africa: The Implications of the Judgment, 42 INT'L AFF. 573 (1966); and
ABA International and Comparative Law Section symposium on the South West Africa
Cases, The World Court's decision on South West Africa, I INT'L LAw. 12 (1966).
57. Fouad Ammoun (Lebanon), Cezar Benqzon (Philippines) and Charles I. Onyeama
(Nigeria). See annex 1 to Gross, The International Court of Justice: Consideration of
Requirements for Enhancing its Role in the International Legal Order, 65 AM. J. INT'L
L. 253, 324 (1971). Strictly speaking, of course, Lebanon is not within the geographical
confines of either Africa or Asia. However, it may be said that, as a general rule,
Lebanon tends to identify and vote with African and Asian interests in the United
Nations.
38. Louis Ignacio Pinto (Dahomey).
39. Article 9 provides:
At every election, the electors shall bear in mind not only that the persons
to be elected should individually possess the qualifications required, but also
that in the body as a whole the representation of the main forms of civiliza-
tion and of the principal legal systems of the world should be assured.
40. See Special Committee On Principles Of Friendly Relations, Report, U.N. Doc.
No. A/6230, at 103 (1966). Professor Falk has suggested that, prior to the 1966 South
West Africa judgment, Afro-Asian countries were "careless" in failing to oppose Judges
who held views contrary to their primary concerns. Falk, Realistic Horizons for Inter-
national Adjudication, 11 VA. J. INT'L L. 314, 319 (1971).
41. See annex 2, Gross, supra note 37, at 325 for qualifications of the judges.
42. Article 2 provides:
The Court shall be composed of a body of independent judges, elected re-
gardless of their nationality from among persons of high moral character, who
possess the qualifications required in their respective countries for appointment
to the highest judicial offices, or are jurisconsuls of recognized competence in
international law.
43. In the 1966 elections Sir Kenneth Bailey of Australia, generally regarded as the
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In further reaction to the Court's judgment, on October 27, 1966, the
General Assembly adopted Resolution 2145(XXI) purporting to termi-
nate South Africa's right to administer the territory.4 4 In pertinent part,
the Assembly declared:
South Africa has failed to fulfill its obligations in respect of the administra-
tion of the Mandated Territory and to ensure the moral and material well-
being and security of the indigenous inhabitants of South West Africa, and
has, in fact, disavowed the Mandate.
and concluded:
The Mandate conferred upon His Britannic Majesty to be exercised on his
behalf by the Government of the Union of South Africa is therefore termi-
nated, that South Africa has no other right to administer the Territory and
that henceforth South West Africa comes under the direct responsibility of the
United Nations.
To implement this resolution, the Assembly established an ad hoc
committee for South West Africa consisting of fourteen states "to
recommend practical means by which South West Africa should be ad-
ministered, so as to enable the people of the territory to exercise the right
of self-determination and to achieve independence." On May 19, 1967, the
Assembly established a United Nations Council for Namibia to take over
the administration of the territory from South Africa.
45
In response to the call of the Assembly, the Security Council, in a series
of meetings on the situation in Namibia, "took note" of Resolution
2145(XXI)46 and called upon South Africa to withdraw its administration
from Namibia immediately,47 declaring that "the continued presence of
the South African authorities in Namibia is illegal" and that therefore
all acts taken by South Africa "on behalf of or concerning Namibia after
the termination of the mandate are illegal and invalid."48 The Council
further called upon "all States, particularly those which have economic
and other interests in Namibia," to refrain from any dealings which
would in any way support South Africa's continued presence in the ter-
ritory.49
most qualified jurist among the candidates, failed of election because of the intense
feeling against Australia generated by Sir Percy Spender's tie-breaking vote in the South
West Africa Cases. Also, Antonio De Luna of Spain was not elected, at least in part
due to feeling against Spain's status as a colonial country.
44. 21 U.N. GAOR Supp. 16, at 2, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (Oct. 26, 1966).
45. G.A. Res. 2248 (s-v), 5 U.N. GAOR, Supp. 1, at I, U.N. Doe. A/6657 (1967).
46. S.C. Res. 245, 23 U.N. SCOR, 1387th meeting 1 (1967).
47. S.C. Res. 264, 24 U.N. SCOR, 1465th meeting 1 (1969); S.C. Res. 269, 24 U.N.
SCOR, 1497th meeting 2 (1969).




South Africa, however, continued its defiance and cited the alleged
illegality of Resolution 2145(XXI) as justification for its position. In
response, the Security Council decided, on July 29, 1970, to request an
advisory opinion from the Court on the question:
What are the legal consequences for States of the continued presence of South
Africa in Namibia, notwithstanding Security Council resolution 276 (1970)?50
By letter of July 29, 1970, the Secretary-General transmitted the Coun-
cil's request to the Court51 ; the President of the Court, by order of
August 28, 1970, set November 19, 1970, as the final date for submission
of written statements. 52 In addition to that of South Africa, written state-
ments were submitted to the Court by the Secretary-General and by
Czechoslovakia, Finland, France, Hungary, India, The Netherlands, Ni-




A. PRELIMINARY AND INCIDENTAL MArrRSs
At the outset, South Africa challenged the participation of three judges
of the Court5 pursuant to article 17(2) of the Court's Statute.5 5 She
questioned the ability of these judges to act impartially because each had
participated in debates on Namibia in his former capacity as representa-
tive of his government at the United Nations. Judge Zafrullah Khan was
particularly objected to because of his designation (though not participa-
tion), prior to being elected to the Court, as judge ad hoc of Ethiopia
and Liberia in the South West Africa cases. 56 The Court rejected all
three objections on the ground that service as a representative of one's
government does not in itself furnish the basis for disqualification under
article 17.5 7 The Court took no note of Judge Khan's designation as a
50. S.C. Res. 284, 25 U.N. SCOR, 1550th meeting 2 (1970).
51. [1971] I.C.J. 16, 18.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Zafrullah Khan (Pakistan), Padilla Nervo (Mexico) and Morozov (USSR).
55. Article 17(2) provides:
No member may participate in the decision of any case in which he has pre-
viously taken part as agent, counsel, or advocate for one of the parties, or as
a member of a national or international court, or of a commission of enquiry,
or in any other capacity.
56. See Statement of the Government of South Africa, November 19, 1970, at 121-26
and Annexes B, C, D, F to ch. IV thereof.
57. [1971] I.CJ. 16, 18.
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judge ad hoc nor of his having disqualified himself in 1966.58 The Court
also denied South Africa's application for appointment of a judge ad hoc
to sit in the proceedings under articles 31(2)59 and 6860 of the Court's
Statute, and article 83 of the Court's rules of procedure, 61 apparently on
the ground that the Namibia question did not involve a "legal question
actually pending between two or more states."62
By letters of January 27, 1971, and February 6, 1971, South Africa pro-
posed that a plebiscite be held in Namibia under the joint supervision of
the Court and South Africa to determine whether the inhabitants wished
"That the Territory should continue to be administered by the South
African government or should henceforth be administered by the United
Nations." 63 South Africa also asked to be allowed to supply the Court
with further factual material concerning the situation in the territory.
At the close of a hearing on March 17, 1971, the President announced
that the Court had decided to defer decision on the South African pro-
posal for a plebiscite on the ground that the Court could not rule on
this request without anticipating its decision on one or more of the main
issues then before it.64 He further stated that the Court had also decided
to defer decision on South Africa's request to supply the Court with addi-
tional factual material concerning the situation in Namibia until it had
had an opportunity to examine the legal issues to determine whether it
58. See supra note 30.
59. Article 31 (2) provides:
If the Court includes upon the Bench a judge of the nationality of one of
the parties, any other party may choose a person to sit as judge. Such person
shall be chosen preferably from among those persons who have been nominated
as candidates as provided in Articles 4 and 5.
60. Article 68 provides:
In the exercise of its advisory functions the Court shall further be guided
by the provisions of the present Statute which apply in contentious cases to
the extent to which it recognizes them to be applicable.
61. Article 83 provides:
If the advisory opinion is requested upon a legal question actually pending
between two or more States, Article 31 of the Statute shall apply, as also the
provisions of these Rules concerning the application of that Article.
62. The Court's opinion does not give any reasons for the rejection of South Africa's
application. See, however, Separate Opinion of Judge Ammoun, [1971J I.CJ. 16, 67-68.
Judges ad hoc are normally not required in advisory proceedings, and, prior to the
proceedings on Namibia, none had been requested. However, under art. 68 of the
Court's Statute, and art. 83 of its rules, it is clear that, if an advisory opinion is re-
quested upon a legal question actually pending between states, the provisions of art. 31
of the Statute regarding judges ad hoc shall apply. See 2 S. ROSENNE, supra note 9, at
206.
63. [1971] I.C.J. 16, 20.
64. Id. at 21.
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would need additional factual data. 5 On May 14, 1971, the President
announced that, ".... the Court, having examined the matter, does not
find itself in need of further arguments or information, and has decided
to refuse both these requests."0 6 ;
South Africa next contended that the Court was not competent to
deliver the opinion because Security Council Resolution 284, which
contained the request for the opinion, was invalid. The resolution was
alleged to be invalid because the abstention of two permanent Council
members67 prevented its adoption by an affirmative vote of nine members,
including the concurring votes of the permanent members of the Coun-
cil, as required by article 27(3) of the Charter.68 In rejecting this argu-
ment, the Court noted that the consistently accepted practice of the
Security Council had been to interpret a voluntary abstention by a per-
manent member as a concurring vote within the meaning of article
27(3).69
South Africa also challenged the validity of Resolution 284 on the
ground that the Security Council, in violation of article 32, failed to
invite South Africa, a party to the dispute, to participate in discussions
on the resolution.70 It further alleged a violation of article 27(3) of the
65. Id.
66. Id. at 21, 56-57. Specifically, South Africa had offered to supply the Court with
further information concerning the purposes and effects of Apartheid and had con-
tended that, in order to establish a breach of its obligations under the mandate, it
would be necessary to show that South Africa's acts were motivated by a purpose
other than that of promoting the interests of the inhabitants of the territory. The
Court, however, stated that the intent of South Africa in applying its policy of
Apartheid was irrelevant to the question whether such actions violated its obligations
under the mandate. Nor, said the Court, was it necessary to determine the effects of
such actions upon the welfare of the inhabitants. To the Court it was axiomatic that
"distinctions, exclusions, restrictions and limitations exclusively based on grounds of
race, colour, descent, or national or ethnic origin [constituted] a denial of fundamental
human rights [and] a flagrant violation of the purposes and principles of the Charter."
Id. at 57.
67. The United Kingdom and France.
68. Article 27(3) provides:
Decisions of the Security Council on all other matters shall be made by an
affirmative vote of nine members including the concurring votes of the perma-
nent members; provided that, in decisions under Chapter VI, and under para-
graph 3 of Article 52, a party to a dispute shall abstain from voting.
69. [1971] I.C.J. 16, 22.
70. Article 32 provides:
Any member of the United Nations which is not a member of the Security
Council or any state which is not a member of the United Nations, if it is a
party to a dispute under consideration by the Security Council, shall be in-
vited to participate, without vote, in the discussion relating to the dispute.
The Security Council shall lay down such conditions as it deems just for the
participation of a state which is not a member of the United Nations.
1972]
Cornell International Law Journal
Charter in that members of the Security Council which were parties to
the dispute did not abstain from voting on it.
The Court rejected both these arguments on the ground that the
question of Namibia should be defined as a "situation," as it was char-
acterized on the Security Council agenda, and not as a "dispute" within
the meaning of articles 27(3) and 32 of the Charter. Absent a "dispute,"
articles 32 and 27(3) did not apply; South Africa's failure to object to
that characterization of the matter before the Council precluded its
raising the issue at this later stage before the Court.71
South Africa's request that the Court should in any event exercise its
discretionary powers under article 65(1) of the Statute72 and decline to
give an advisory opinion was based on a contention that immense po-
litical pressures surrounding the situation precluded an impartial adju-
dication of the issues. The Court summarily refused to consider this
allegation.73
South Africa further argued that the Court should decline to issue an
advisory opinion on the basis of the decision of the Permanent Court
of International Justice in the Eastern Carelia case.74 , The International
Court of Justice found Eastern Carelia inapposite, distinguishing that
case from the Namibia situation on several grounds. South Africa had
been a member of the United Nations at the time the situation in
71. [1971] I.CJ. 16, 22-23.
72. Article 65(1) provides:
The Court may give an advisory opinion on any legal question at the request
of whatever body may be authorized by or in accordance with the Charter of
the United Nations to make such a request.
73. In the words of the Court:
It would not be proper for the Court to entertain these observations, bear-
ing as they do on the very nature of the Court as the principal judicial organ
of the United Nations, an organ which, in that capacity, acts only on the basis
of the law, independently of all outside influence or interventions whatsoever,
in the exercise of the judicial function entrusted to it alone by the Charter
and its Statute. A court functioning as a court of law can act in no other way.
[1971] LCJ. 16, 23.
74. Advisory Opinion on Eastern Carelia, [1923) P.C.I.J., ser. B, No. 5, at 27. In that
case, the Council of the League had requested an opinion on whether the Russo-
Finnish Peace Treaty of 1920 regarding the autonomy of Eastern Carelia required
Russia to carry out the Treaty's provisions concerning that region. Russia, not a
member of the League of Nations, had refused to participate in the League's con-
sideration of the dispute and had objected to the Permanent Court's hearing the
case on the ground that it was a matter falling solely within Russia's domestic
jturisdiction. The Permanent Court declined to give an advisory opinion. It noted
at the opinion would advise the Council of the League on an actual dispute be-
tween Russia and Finland, that no state could, without its consent, be compelled to
submit its disputes with other states to peaceful settlement, and that, in the absence
of Russia's participation, the Court would not be able to satisfactorily determine the
factual issues in the case.
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Namibia was under consideration, had appeared before the Court and
participated in both written and oral proceedings and, although object-
ing to the competence of the Court, had addressed itself to the merits.
The Court repeated 75 its conclusion that the situation in Namibia did
not constitute a dispute between South Africa and the United Nations.
In the Court's view the possibility it might have to pronounce on legal
issues on which South Africa and the United Nations held different views
did not convert the case into a dispute within the meaning of articles
82 and 83 of the Rules of the Court. It noted that different views among
states on legal issues were often the reason resort to the Court for an
advisory opinion was necessary.76
B. MATTERS OF SUBSTANCE
Having disposed of preliminary matters, the Court turned to a con-
sideration of the question submitted to it and to a number of contentions
raised by South Africa. South Africa had contended that "C" mandates
differed in their purpose and legal effect from "A" and "B" mandates
under the League mandates system and that "C" mandates were in effect
tantamount to annexation. Recalling its 1950 advisory opinion, which
noted that the principle of nonannexation and the principle that the
well-being and development of the people of the territory formed a
"sacred trust of civilization" were of fundamental importance in the
setting up of the mandates system,7 7 the Court concluded it was "unable
to accept any construction which would attach to 'C' mandates an object
and purpose different from those of 'A' or 'B' mandates."7 8 To find
otherwise, the Court said, would "mean that territories under 'C' man-
dates belonged to the family of mandates only in name, being in fact
the objects of disguised cessions .... ,79
Similarly, as it had in its 1950 opinion, the Court summarily rejected
South Africa's allegations that the mandate had lapsed upon dissolution
of the League or that, in the alternative, the United Nations had not
75. See the discussion of the Court's disposition of South Africa's challenge to the
validity of Resolution 284, supra notes 67-71 and accompanying text.
76. [1971] I.C.J. 16, 24-25.
77. Advisory Opinion on International Status of South West Africa, supra note 6,
at 131.
78. [1971] I.C.J. 16, 32.
79. Id.
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succeeded to the supervisory functions of the League over the mandate.
In the opinion of the Court, "an institution established for the fulfill-
ment of a sacred trust cannot be presumed to lapse before the achieve-
ment of its purpose."8 0 To accept South Africa's contention on this
point, the Court said, "would have entailed the reversion of mandated
territories to colonial status, and the virtual replacement of the mandates
regime by annexation, so determinedly excluded in 1920."81 The Court
further opined that the effect of article 80(1) of the Charter8 2 was to en-
sure that the rights of the inhabitants of Namibia would be safeguarded
by continued international supervision over the territory by the United
Nations in its role as successor to the supervisory responsibilities of the
League of Nations.8s
The Court also rejected South Africa's argument that "new facts" not
fully before the Court in 1950 indicated the supervisory power of the
League over mandates did not pass to the United Nations. Specifically,
South Africa alleged that rejection of proposals introduced by the Chi-
nese delegation at the final assembly of the League and by the Executive
Committee to the United Nations Preparatory Commission, providing
in explicit terms for the transfer of supervisory functions over mandates
from the League to the United Nations, compelled a conclusion that no
such transfer was intended. To the Court, however, it was not possible
to infer from the rejection of these proposals that no transfer of super-
visory responsibility had taken place. The Court noted that the Chinese
proposal was never considered, but rather was ruled out of order because
it would have subjected mandated territories to a form of supervision
by the United Nations going beyond the scope of the existing supervisory
authority of the League. As for the proposal of the Executive Committee,
which called for the establishment of a temporary trusteeship committee,
the Court pointed out that it was rejected on the ground that setting up
such an organ might delay the negotiation and conclusion of trusteeship
80. Id.
81. Id. at 33.
82. Article 80(1) provides:
Except as may be agreed upon in individual trusteeship agreements, made
under Articles 77, 79, and 81, placing each territory under the trusteeship
system, and until such agreements have been concluded, nothing in this Chap.
ter shall be construed in or of itself to alter in any manner the rights what-
soever of any States or any peoples or the terms of existing international in-
struments to which Members of the United Nations may respectively be
parties.
83. [1971] I.CJ. 16, 33-34.
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agreements, especially with mandatory states. It noted that in discussions
on the proposal the South African representative himself had declared
that "it seemed reasonable to create an interim body as the Mandates
Commission was now in abeyance and countries holding mandates should
have a body to which they could report."8 4 In fact, the Court found a
general assumption of the delegates to the United Nations Preparatory
Commission that the supervisory powers of the League over mandates
were to be exercised by the United Nations.
The Court next turned to the South African and French 5 contention
that the General Assembly acted ultra vires in adopting Resolution 2145
(XXI) terminating the mandate. At the outset, it noted that some repre-
sentatives argued that the ultra vires issue could not even be considered
by the Court since the question submitted by the Security Council did
not cover the validity of Resolution 2145(XXI) and the Court was not
authorized to assume a power of judicial review of the actions of United
Nations organs. The Court acknowledged the force of these arguments,
but decided, "in the exercise of its judicial functions," to consider the
objections nonetheless.8 6
The Charter, according to the Court, contemplated a two step proce-
dure with reference to League mandates. Initially, the mandatory powers
assumed an obligation under article 80 to preserve the rights of the
peoples of the mandated territories as well as the rights other states
claimed in those territories. Ultimately, it was expected that trusteeship
agreements would be conciuded to restructure the mandatory's relation-
ship to the newly created United Nations. Since a trusteeship agreement
had not been concluded, paragraph 3 of Resolution 2145(XXI) declared
both that South Africa had failed to fulfill its mandate obligations with
respect to the administration of Namibia and that South Africa had in
fact disavowed the mandate. Therefore, South Africa had lost whatever
rights it had under the mandate. This conclusion was reached on the
theory that "a party which disowns or does not fulfill its own obligations
cannot be recognized as retaining the rights which it claims to derive
from the relationship."8 7 The termination action of the General Assembly
was consistent, according to the Court, with general principles of inter-
84. Id. at 36.
85. See 10 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 302, 804 (1971).
86. t1971] I.C.J. 16, 45.
87. Id. at 46.
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national law regulating termination of a treaty relationship on account
of breach. In support of this statement, the Court referred to the con-
clusion in its 1962 opinion that the mandate was an international agree-
ment having the character of a treaty or convention88 and to the provi-
sions in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties8 justifying
termination of a treaty in the event of material breach.
South Africa argued strenuously that the Council of the League had
no power to terminate a mandate in case of misconduct by the manda-
tory, and therefore, could not transfer such a power to the United Na-
tions. It relied upon the failure of the Paris Peace Conference to adopt
a proposal regarding a right of appeal by the people of Namibia for the
substitution of some other state or agency as mandatory. But such re-
jection did not, in the Court's view, indicate that the drafters in the
mandates system intended to exclude application of general principles
of treaty law concerning termination from the system. Rather, the pro-
posal was rejected because some states were concerned that, if it were
adopted, there would be no guarantee of long-term continuation of ad-
ministration by the mandatory. According to the Court, the compromise
solution adopted was that the Council of the League would not interfere
with the day-to-day administration of the territories, but would intervene
under general principles of treaty law in case of a fundamental breach
of the mandatory's obligations.90
The Court also rejected South Africa's argument that, even if the
Council of the League had the power to revoke the mandate in an ex-
treme case, it could not have exercised this power without the consent
of the mandatory. In the Court's view, acceptance of this position would,
".. . not only run contrary to the general principle of law governing
termination on account of breach, but also postulate an impossibility."'91
Accordingly, the consent of the wrongdoer to termination of a mandate
based on its failure to fulfill its responsibilities could not be required.02
Having disposed of South Africa's objection to the validity of the
United Nations' actions regarding Namibia, the Court turned to a con-
88. SWA Cases 1962, at 331.
89. Article 60(3). For the text of the Convention, see 63 AM. J. INT'L L. 875 (1969);
8 INT'L LEGAL MATERLALS 679 (1969). For an exhaustive discussion of the convention,
see Kearney & Dalton, The Treaty on Treaties, 64 AM. J. INT'L L. 495 (1970).
90. [1971] I.C.J. 16, 48.




sideration of the legal consequences arising for states from South Africa's
continued presence in the territory. Once a United Nations organ makes
a binding determination that a situation is illegal, the Court said, the
primary obligation of member states is to bring that situation to an
end. 93 South Africa, the Court continued, having created and main-
tained the illegal situation, has the obligation to withdraw its admin-
istration from Namibia. At the same time, although South Africa has
no title or right to administer the territory by continuing in de facto
occupation, it remains under international obligation toward other states
with respect to its administration of the area, and accountable for any
violations of the rights of the people of Namibia.94 Other member states
were required to recognize the illegality of South Africa's continued
presence in Namibia, and to refrain from actions that might lend sup-
port to South Africa's occupation of Namibia. The political organs of
the United Nations were to determine precisely what actions would be
permissible or impermissible.
For its part, the Court specified as impermissible only dealings with
South Africa that might imply a recognition that South Africa's presence
in Namibia was legal or serve to entrench South Africa's authority over
the territory.95 On the other hand, the Court said, non-recognition of
South Africa's administration of Namibia should not deprive the people
of the territory of any of the advantages of international cooperation.
As examples, the Court pointed out that non-recognition of the validity
of South Africa's registration of births, deaths and marriages in Namibia
could only redound to the detriment of the inhabitants of the territory.96
III
THE DISSENTING OPINIONS
Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice of the United Kingdom and Andre Gros of
France filed dissenting opinions. Judge Fitzmaurice criticized the Court's
opinion on nearly every issue. In particular, he denied that South Africa
had any obligation to the United Nations as successor to the League
93. Id. at 54. In so ruling, the Court rejected a contention that art. 25 of the Charter
applies only to enforcement measures adopted under ch. VII of the Charter. Id. at
52-53.
94. Id. at 54.
95. Id. at 54-56.
96. Id. at 56.
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relative to Namibia, and that, in any event, neither the League nor the
United Nations had the power to unilaterally terminate the mandate.
Tracing the history of mandates after the demise of the League, Judge
Fitzmaurice found that while the mandates survived dissolution, the
United Nations did not succeed to the League's supervisory functions
because (1) no special arrangement providing for such succession had
in fact been made; indeed, several specific proposals to this effect had
been made and rejected; (2) such a succession could not in any way be
implied; and (3) any such succession required South Africa's consent
to the substitution of the United Nations as supervisor for the League,
which had not been givenY7 It was only if a mandated territory was
placed under United Nations trusteeship that a supervisory relationship
could arise because no mandates were ever, as such, administered on
behalf of the United Nations.
Even assuming arguendo that the United Nations succeeded to the
supervisory powers of the League, Judge Fitzmaurice continued, these
did not include any power of unilateral revocation of a mandate, and
United Nations powers of supervision over the mandate, which were
derived from the League, were no broader.98 He further rejected the
majority's premise that the law regarding breach and termination of
private contracts and ordinary international treaties and agreements,
under which fundamental breaches by one party would release the other
from its own obligations, was applicable to the institutional structure
of the mandates system. Indeed, such an approach involved a "total
inconsistency," since, if fundamental breaches could justify unilateral
revocation on the basis of contractual principles, these same principles
would preclude substituting a new party to the contract for an old one
without the latter's consent.99
In Judge Fitzmaurice's view, the basic fallacy of the Court's opinion
lay in failing to recognize that the parties involved in the mandates
system were sovereign states-and not private parties subject to a higher
authority in the state-and that the real issue was whether a state could
be ousted from an administrative responsibility it had voluntarily under-
taken. Such an unusual grant of power, to make an assignment revocable
upon the unilateral pronouncement of another party, he stated, could
97. Dissenting Opinion of Judge Fitzmaurice, [1971] I.C.J. 16, at 227-65,
98. Id. at 264.
99. Id. at 267,
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only be found in an express provision for unilateral termination and
could not be based on implied or inherent powers.100
Such a conception of the lack of League power to unilaterally termi-
nate a mandate was found in the non-peremptory nature of the mandates
system. Thus, the sole function of the Council of the League was to
examine reports from the mandatory and petitions from the inhabitants
concerning the mandatory's administration of the territory. The Council
could require that the mandatory's reports contain full information, and
the Council could comment on these reports and indicate disapproval
of certain measures, but, Judge Fitzmaurice said, these suggestions would
have no binding effect unless the mandatory agreed.101
Especially noteworthy, in Judge Fitzmaurice's view, was the League's
rejection of President Wilson's proposal that the mandates system con-
tain provisions for the replacement of mandatories in the event of breach
of obligations. He pointed out that specific objections to the concept of
revocability were made by all the eventual holders of "C" mandates,
and by most of the eventual holders of "A" and "B" mandates. Spe-
cifically, he referred to the statements of France and of Great Britain
concerning the economic and other difficulties that would arise if the
mandatories did not have complete security of tenure.10 2 In his view,
".... the classic instance of the creation of an irrebuttable presumption
in favor of a given intention is, precisely, where a different course has
been proposed but not followed."' 03
Such a power of termination was most doubtful in cases of "C" man-
dates such as South Africa's. Paragraph 6 of article 22 of the League
Covenant, which described "C" mandated territories as territories that
could "be best administered under the laws of the Mandatory as integral
portions of its territory," was incompatible with the concept of unilateral
revocability. Judge Fitzmaurice acknowledged that this provision did not
amount to an authorization for de jure or at least de facto incorporation
because a purpose of the mandates system was to avoid annexation or
cession in sovereignty of the mandated territory. But, he said, it did
preclude any interim change in administration of the territory without
the consent of the mandatory.1°4
100. Id.
101. Id. at 268-70.
102. Id. at 274.
103. Id. at 274-75.
104. Id. at 275-76.
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Lastly, Judge Fitzmaurice contended that the mandates system repre-
sented a compromise between President Wilson's desire to place these
territories under direct League administration and the desire of some
of the Allied countries, like South Africa, to obtain a cession to them-
selves of these territories. In his view, this compromise was only reluc-
tantly accepted by some of the mandatories. Further he believed that
the holders of the "C" mandates in particular would never have agreed
to a system whereby sometime in the future at the will of the League
Council, they might find themselves displaced from the territories in
favor of a new and possibly hostile or unfriendly administrator. 105 In
further support of this contention, he noted that no provision for uni-
lateral revocation by the United Nations had been included in the
stronger and more centralized trusteeship system. The most reasonable
inference to draw from this, he said, was that there was no intent to give
the United Nations such a power, and not that it was unnecessary because
all international mandates and trusts are inherently subject to unilateral
revocation.106
Judge Fitzmaurice further argued that, even if the General Assembly
inherited a supervisory role over the mandate, it could exercise it only
within the limits of its competence under the Charter and, except with
respect to specified subjects,107 the powers of the Assembly were solely
those of discussion and recommendation. According to him, the Assem-
bly had no authority to act, in effect, as both complainant and judge
with respect to a subject. Moreover, while the Assembly had express
power under articles 5 and 6 of the Charter to suspend or expel a man-
datory from the United Nations, it did not have any implied power to
evict a mandatory from the administration of its territory 08
105. Id. at 277.
106. Id. at 278.
107. In a footnote to his opinion, Judge Fitzmaurice listed as the only provisions
of the Charter conferring executive or quasi-executive powers on the Assembly:
Articles 4, 5 and 6, which enable the Assembly to admit a new member, or
suspend or expel an existing one-in each case only upon the recommenda-
tion of the Security Council; and Article 17, under paragraph I of which the
Assembly is to consider and approve the budget of the Organization, with the
Corollary (paragraph 2) that the expenses of the Organization are to be borne
by the members "as apportioned by the Assembly." Under paragraph 8, the
Assembly is to "consider and approve" financial arrangements with the spe-
cialized agencies, but is only to "examine" their budgets "with a view to mak-
ing recommendations" to them.
Id. at 282, n.62, para. (d).
108. Id. at 288.
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The Security Council, according to Judge Fitzmaurice, had promul-
gated "consequential" resolutions on Namibia in that the Council had
no independent authority to terminate South Africa's mandate. Rather,
he said, the Council's resolutions proceeded on the basis of a valid
termination already declared by the Assembly. Further, the Council did
not have the authority under its peacekeeping power to effect definitive
changes in territorial sovereignty or administrative rights. The Council
might order the occupation of a country or territory in order to restore
peace and security, but it had no power thereby to alter territorial
rights. 09
In an annex to this opinion,"10 Judge Fitzmaurice concluded: (1) the
Assembly had exceeded its powers by adopting Resolution 2145(XXI) in
that it had acted as a court of law; (2) the Court was correct in consider-
ing the validity of Resolution 2145(XXI); (3) the Court was correct in
complying with the request for an advisory opinion; and (4) the Court's
rejection of South Africa's request for appointment of a judge ad hoc
was wrong in law and unjustified as a matter of equity and fair dealing.
In his dissent, Judge Gros argued that the Court's rejection of the
challenges to certain members of the Court and its refusal to grant a
request by South Africa for the appointment of a judge ad hoc did not
".... satisfy the requirements of that good administration of Justice which
it is the purpose of the Statute and Rules to secure.""' Turning to a
consideration of Resolution 2145(XXI) Judge Gros, like Judge Fitzmau-
rice, viewed it as merely a recommendation with no binding force on
member states of the United Nations. He pointed to the 1950 advisory
opinion of the Court which stated that the status of Namibia could be
modified only by South Africa with the consent of the United Nations. 21
Conceding that the Court's conclusion at that time related only to South
Africa's claim to be able to modify the status of the territory unilaterally,
Judge Gros noted that the problem was raised before the Court although
never put directly in issue, 13 and found that the statement also applied
to the issue of United Nations power to revoke the mandate unilaterally.
Judge Gros also rejected the argument that the General Assembly had
109. Id. at 291-95.
110. Id. at 299-317.
111. Dissenting Opinion of Judge Gros, [19711 I.C.J. 16, 331.
112. Advisory Opinion on International Status of South West Africa, supra note 6.
113. Dissenting Opinion of Judge Gros, supra note 111, at 335.
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the power to revoke unilaterally the mandate under general principles
of treaty law. In his view, it is not correct to equate a mandate with a
treaty. Moreover, he said, even if one concedes that a mandate is a form
of a treaty, there is no rule in the law of treaties that enables our party
at its sole discretion to terminate a treaty in any case in which it alleges
a breach by the other party. Rather, according to Judge Gros, such an
action can only be taken pursuant to the decision of a third party."14
In the final analysis, Judge Gros contended, the argument for the uni-
lateral power of revocation of the mandate by the Assembly was based
solely on the concept of necessity. Such an argument, he contended,
admitted the non-existence of any legal justification and "indeed to in-
voke necessity is to step outside the law.""15
Iv
EVALUATION OF THE COURT'S OPINION
At the outset of this critique of the Court's opinion, it is perhaps
desirable to note the difficulties inherent in such an exercise. The salient
fact of the Namibian situation is that it involves the extension of Apart-
heid beyond the borders of South Africa. Apartheid is in turn inextrica-
bly intertwined with the emotionally laden issue of racial discrimination
and represents an especially vicious instance of discriminatory practices.
Therefore, there is a substantial danger that one's antipathy for Apart-
heid may cloud one's judgment on the legal issues and hinder objective
analysis of the full implications of a particular decision or course of ac-
tion. It is the contention of this writer that, notwithstanding one's pos-
sible personal abhorrence of Apartheid, the Court's opinion is subject
to serious criticism from several perspectives. Rather than attempting to
evaluate all the numerous and complicated facets of the Court's opinion,
this critique will highlight those areas of primary concern.
A. PRELIMINARY AND INCIDENTAL MATrERs: DISQUALIFICATION OF
JUDGES, APPOINTMENT OF A JUDGE AD Hoc AND THE
PROPOSAL FOR A PLEBISCITE
The Court's rejection of South Africa's challenges to the participation
of Judges Khan, Nervo and Morozov was based on the principle that
114. Id. at 338-39.
115. Id. at 339.
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service as a representative of one's government in discussions on a matter
before the Court does not in itself require disqualification under article
17 of the Statute.116 However, the Court failed to evaluate the possible
prejudicial nature of the three judges' service. For example, Judge Khan
actively participated in the drafting and was a co-sponsor of Security
Council Resolution 246 which noted and approved the Assembly's ter-
mination of the mandate. As observed by Judge Gros, "7 judge Khan's
speeches at the time of drafting the Resolution left no doubt as to his
position on the substantive issues later before the Court. Indeed, the
Court does not even mention that judge Khan disqualified himself from
sitting in the 1966 contentious proceedings. Similarly, there was no com-
ment by the Court on South Africa's allegations that Judge Morozov's
activities as representative of his government at the United Nations con-
tinued through the time when the General Assembly adopted Resolu-
tion 2145(XXI) and that, since all three judges played leading and out-
spoken roles in the attack on South Africa, their activities far exceeded
the bounds of representative advocacy. It is noteworthy that Judges
Fitzmaurice," 8 Gros, x9 Onyeama,12 0 and Petren121 all expressed serious
reservations regarding the Court's summarily rejecting South Africa's
objections to the composition of the bench.
The same jurists plus Judge Dillard,122 all dissented from the order of
the Court123 denying South Africa's application for appointment of a
judge ad hoc. By its terms,124 article 31(2) of the Court's Statute applies
only to contentious proceedings. But, under article 83 of the Rules of
Court, application of article 31 of the Statute is also mandatory if an
".... advisory opinion is requested upon a legal question actually pend-
ing between two or more States... " The Court's determination that
116. [1971] I.C.J. 16, 18-19.
117. Dissenting Opinion of Judge Gros, supra note 111, at 323-24.
118. Dissenting Opinion of Judge Fitzmaurice, supra note 97, at 308-09.
119. Dissenting Opinion of Judge Gros, supra note 111, at 311-12.
120. Separate Opinion of Judge Onyeama, [1971] I.C.J. 16, 138-39.
121. Separate Opinion of Judge Petren, [19V1] I.C.J. 16, 130.
122. Separate Opinion of Judge Dillard, [1971] I.C.J. 16, 152-53; Dissenting Opinion
of Judge Fitzmaurice, supra note 97, at 308-17; Dissenting Opinion of Judge Gros,
supra note 111, at 325-31; Separate Opinion of Judge Onyeama, sapra note 120, at
1;9-41, Separate Opinion of Judge Petren, supra note 121, at 129-130.
128. Order of January 29, 1971.
124. Artide 31(2) provides:
If the Court includes upon the Bench a judge of the nationality of one of
the parties, any other party may choose a person to sit as judge. Such person
shall be chosen preferably from among those persons who have been nomi-
nated as candidates as provided in Articles 4 and 5.
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there was no legal question actually pending between South Africa and
other member states of the United Nations, nor between South Africa
and the organization itself, seems, as pointed out by Judge Gros,1
25 to
fly in the face of reality. The validity of the General Assembly's unilateral
revocation of the mandate was the legal issue actually pending between
South Africa and other interested parties, and efforts of the Court to
justify its position by classification of the Namibia problem as a "situa-
don" instead of a "dispute" are an exercise in legal sophistry.
In rejecting South Africa's request for the appointment of a judge ad
hoc pursuant to article 68 of the Statute12 the Court apparently deter-
mined that Rule 83 of the Court's Statute limited its discretion to appoint
a judge ad hoc to cases involving a legal question actually pending be-
tween two or more states.' 27 Judge Fitzmaurice, however, cogently refutes
this argument by pointing out that the ". .. object of the Rule was not
to specify the only class of case in which the Court could so act, but to
indicate the one class in which it must do so .... "1 28 Moreover, the lan-
guage of article 82, paragraph 1, of the Court's Rules 20 supports this
view. This language, as Judge Fitzmaurice explains, clearly makes the
test of a legal question actually pending between states a primary, but
not exclusive, factor in the Court's determination whether to apply any
of the contentious proceeding provisions, not only those of article 31.10
If the Court did not lack the power to grant South Africa's request for
a judge ad hoc, appointment of such a judge seems the only course com-
patible with concepts of minimal due process and fundamental fairness.
In this connection, Judge Onyeama's observation appears particularly
apt:
125. Dissenting Opinion of Judge Gros, supra note III, at 326.
126. Article 68 provides:
In the exercise of its advisory functions the Court shall further be guided by
the provisions of the present Statute which apply in contentious cases to the
extent to which it recognizes them to be applicable.
127. See supra note 62.
128. Dissenting Opinion of Judge Fitzmaurice, supra note 97, at 310 (emphasis in
original).
129. Article 82(1) provides:
In proceedings in regard to advisory opinions the Court shall, in addition
to the provisions of Article 96 of the Charter and Chapter IV of the Statute,
apply the provisions of the Articles which follow. It shall also be guided by
the provisions of these Rules which apply in contentious cases to the extent
to which it recognizes them to be applicable; for this purpose it shall above
all consider whether the request for the advisory opinion relates to a legal
question actually pending between two or more States.
130. Dissenting Opinion of Judge Fitzmaurice supra note 97, at 310-11.
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I am of the opinion that the drcumstance of South Africa's spedal interest
in the present request should have prevailed with the Court, and, so that Jus-
tice may not only be done but manifestly be seen to be done, the discretion
of the Court should have been exercised in favour of the application by South
Africa to choose a judge ad hoc.131
As indicated earlier, 32 the Court initially deferred decision on South
Africa's proposal for a plebiscite and its request to be allowed to supply
the Court with further factual material regarding the situation in Nami-
bia on the ground that the Court could not rule on these requests without
anticipating its decision on one or more of the main issues then before it.
The Court, however, did not indicate what these issues were. The only
issue to which further information on the situation in Namibia would
be relevant would be the compatibility of South Africa's application of
Apartheid to Namibia with it obligation under the mandate, but this
was not in fact an issue before the Court. At no point did the Court
indicate that the competence of the General Assembly to unilaterally
revoke the mandate was in any way dependent on the validity of the
Assembly's finding that South Africa had failed to fulfill its obligations
in respect of the administration of the mandated territory. Although the
Court states that the practices of Apartheid "constitute a denial of fun-
damental human rights" and "a flagrant violation of the purposes and
principles of the Charter,"1 33 there is no indication that, in so stating,
the Court was reviewing the similar finding of the Assembly, and that
this statement appears to be dictum. Rather, the Court, in its delibera-
tions, assumed arguendo the validity of this finding, and considered the
competence of the Assembly to unilaterally revoke the mandate.
The more fundamental question, however, is whether the compatibility
of South Africa's application of Apartheid to Namibia with its obliga-
tions under the mandate was in fact irrelevant, or whether it should have
been an issue before the Court. Later discussion 34 will suggest that a
judicial determination on this issue was an indispensable precondition
to the Assembly's power to terminate the mandate. If this analysis has
merit, it follows that a plebiscite in the territory and the submission of
further factual information by South Africa would be highly relevant to
the Court's proceedings. 135
131. Separate Opinion of Judge Onyeama, supra note 120, at 140 (emphasis added).
132. See notes 63-66 supra and accompanying text.
133. [1971] I.CJ. 16, 57.
134. See infra notes 152-57 and accompanying text.
135. It is no answer to argue that South Africa should submit any proposal for a
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B. MATTERS OF SUBSTANCE: VALIDITY OF UNILATERAL
REVOCATION OF THE MANDATE
The substantive issue of overriding importance, which received lengthy
consideration in each of the opinions, was the competence of the United
Nations to unilaterally revoke the mandate. This same issue of the As-
sembly's power of unilateral revocation has been considered in other
forums136 and it does not seem useful to exhaustively review the argu-
ments here. This is a subject on which reasonable men can and do dif-
fer.137
Perhaps it would be appropriate, however, to focus for a moment on
one consideration which has not been previously treated in detail. As
Judge Fitzmaurice noted, 3 8 under the trusteeship system of the United
Nations, none of the trust agreements give the General Assembly, the
Security Council or any other United Nations organ unilateral power of
revocation of the trusteeship. The language of article 79 of the Charter
implies that revocation of the trusteeship can occur only with the agree-
ment of the administering authority, 139 and, in some instances, trustee-
ship agreements expressly provide that the agreement cannot be altered
or amended except in accordance with article 79.140
Moreover, this construction of article 79 finds strong support in the
negotiating history of the trusteeship provisions. In preliminary discus-
sions at San Francisco among the Five Powers, China proposed that pro-
vision be made for action against violators of a trusteeship agreement.
The United States, however, strongly objected and no reference to criteria
plebiscite to the United Nations, the supervisory authority over the Territory. See
Panel on the Future of South West Africa (Namibia), 1971 PRoc, Am. So'Y INT'L L.
164. The Court has need for information on conditions in the territory to make a
determination on the issue of Apartheid, and a fairly conducted plebiscite would
greatly assist the Court in gaining further insight into those conditions.
136. See, e.g., Dugard, The Revocation of the Mandate For South West Africa, 62
AM. J. INT'L L. 78 (1968); Crawford, South West Africa: Mandate Termination in His-
torical Perspective, 6 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 91 (1967); and Q. WRIGr, supra note
16, at 122, 123, 519.
137. Compare Dugard, supra note 136 with Dissenting Opinion of Justice Fitamaurice,
supra note 97.
138. Dissenting Opinion of Justice Fitzmaurice, supra note 97, at 278.
139. Article 79 provides:
The terms of trusteeship for each territory to be placed under the trustee-
ship system, including any alteration or amendment, shall be agreed upon
by the states directly concerned, including the mandatory power in the case
of territories held under mandate by a member of the United Nations, and
shall be approved as provided for in Articles 83 and 85.
140. See 1 M. WHrrEMAN, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 898 (1963).
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or methods for terminating a trust or for transferring it from one admin-
istering authority to another was included in the Five Powers Working
Paper.141 During discussion of the Working Paper in committee, the
United States representative said that termination of a trust or a change
in the administering authority would constitute "alterations" of the
trusteeship agreement. In such event, it would be necessary for the states
originally concerned to agree to changes which could then be approved by
the organization. Compulsory transfer of a territory, the United States
representative said, could only be effected by the Security Council if
necessary to quell a breach of the peace. In response to a question whether
the Assembly could take action against an administering authority that
violated its obligations, the only United States response was that, in such
event, the people of the territory (if nonstrategic) would have the right
of petition.
142
Egypt thereupon offered an amendment that would have expressly
given the Assembly the authority to transfer a territory under trustee-
ship to another administering authority in the event of a violation of the
terms of the trusteeship agreement by the original administering au-
thority. Both the United States and Great Britain strongly opposed this
amendment, arguing that unilateral termination or transfer of trust areas
would be contrary to the voluntary basis of the trusteeship system and
that it would obviously be difficult to take a trusteeship area from a state
unwilling to surrender it.143 No formal action was ever taken on the
Egyptian proposal.
44
141. RussFuL 8g MuTHER, A HisroRy OF THE UNiTD NATIONS CHARTER 836-37 (1958).
142. Id. at 837; 10 U.N.C.I.O. Does. 506, 507 (1945).
143. 10 U.N.C.I.O, Docs. 510, 548 (1945).
144. Instead, the committee chairman asked the United Kingdom and the United
States to prepare a response to two questions:
If a state withdraws from the United Nations Organization and continues
to hold a trust territory under the Charter, how is the Organization to con-
tinue to exercise its responsibilities with respect to the administration of that
trust territory? And if a state administering trust territory commits an act of
aggression, what consequences will follow in relation to its trust?
Id. at 548.
To the first question the response of the two Powers was that the withdrawing state
would be under an obligation to continue to cooperate with the United Nations with
respect to its trust responsibilities. To the second the Powers answered that the
Security Council could act as with any other threat to the peace. If the administering
state's violation of the trust did not amount to a threat to the peace, the Powers said,
the resulting situation "could only be judged by the General Assembly and the Se-
curity Council on its merits," and, "lit is impossible to make provision in advance
for such a situation." Id. at 601-02. The Committee included the statement in its re-
port, with a note that it was not an official committee position. Id. at 620-21.
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In the words of Judge Fitzmaurice, if no trusteeship can be terminated
without the consent of the administering authority, "why should it be so
unthinkable that a mandate should not be terminable without the con-
sent of the mandatory?"145 Nowhere in the discussions on the Egyptian
proposal does one find a reference to a power of unilateral revocation of
mandates on the part of the League of Nations. It is therefore reasonable
to infer that the purpose of the Egyptian proposal was to remedy a defi-
ciency of the mandates system which would presumably continue to exist
under the proposed trusteeship arrangements, rather than to transfer to
the United Nations a power enjoyed by the League.
It is also worth noting that article 15 of the United Nations Trustee-
ship Agreement on the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands 46 sped-
fically provides that, "The terms of the present Agreement shall not be
altered, amended or terminated without the consent of the Administering
Authority." The Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands has been desig-
nated a "Strategic Trusteeship." Although the concept of strategic areas
did not find formal expression in the mandates system, surely South
Africa has always regarded Namibia as a strategic area in terms of its own
territorial security. Also, as we have seen,147 South Africa fully expected
ultimately to be permitted to incorporate Namibia into its own territory.
It is therefore not reasonable to conclude that South Africa accepted the
mandate on the understanding that the League had the power uni-
laterally to revoke the mandate and transfer the territory to another,
potentially hostile power.
The question remains whether the League might still have some re-
course against South Africa if it violated its obligations under the man-
date. The answer may be that the League qua League was to have no
recourse except by way of exhortation, but individual members of the
League could proceed against South Africa in the Permanent Court of
International Justice under article 7 of the mandate and, in the event of
a decision against South Africa, the Council of the League would have
the power under article 13(4) of the Covenant 148 to enforce the judgment
145. Dissenting Opinion of Justice Fitzmaurice, supra note 97, at 283, n.64.
146. Trusteeship Agreement for the Former Japanese Mandated Islands, April 2,
1947, 61 Stat. (3) S301, T.I.A.S. No. 1665, 8 U.N.T.S. 189.
147. See notes 12-13 supra and accompanying text.
148. Article 13 (4) provided:
The Members of the League agree that they will carry out in full good
faith any award or decision that may be rendered, and that they will not re-
sort to war against a Member of the League which complies therewith. In the
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of the Court by revocation of the mandate. This is the view of leading
writers on the mandates system. 49
This view was, of course, seriously undercut by the 1966 decision of the
Court that individual members of the League had no legal right or in-
terest in the mandatory's administration of the mandate. As wrong as
that decision may have been, the fact is the Court rendered it, and the
effect of the 1966 decision was to deny standing to any member state to
enforce the mandatory's obligations. This left three remaining possibili-
ties: first, the United Nations might still have the standing to enforce
the mandatory's obligations which member states lacked; second, the
Court might have delegated judicial power to the United Nations to de-
termine whether South Africa violated its obligations under the mandate
and, in the event of such a determination, unilaterally to revoke the man-
date in order to carry out its decision; third, the decision might have
made any termination of the mandate impossible.
The third possibility can be easily rejected on the grounds set forth
above, viz., that the draftsmen of the League provisions contemplated
actions against violators of the mandate. The second possibility, that of
allowing unilateral United Nations termination, would contradict (1) the
intention of the drafters of the mandates system not to subject manda-
tories to unilateral modification or termination of mandates by the
League and (2) the separation of powers between the United Nations and
the Court set forth in the Charter and the Court's Statute, especially the
Court's role as the principal judicial organ of the United Nations.150 In-
deed, such a result would be contrary to the Court's statements in its 1966
opinion that the powers of the League were limited to negotiation, con-
ciliation, and persuasion in attempting to enforce South Africa's obliga-
tions under the mandate, particularly since South Africa had a veto
power under the League's rules.' 51
In the opinion of this writer, the only course of action available to
event of any failure to carry out such an award or decision, the Council shall
propose what steps should be taken to give effect thereto.
149. See, e.g., Q. WurGHT, supra note 16, at 521; Hales, Some Legal Aspects of the
Mandate System: Sovereignty-Nationality-Termination and Transfer, 23 TRANSAr.
GROT. Soc'Y 85, 122 (1938); Hales, The Creation and Application of the Mandate
System, 25 id. 185, 211 (1940).
150. See art. 92 of the Charter and art. I of the Court's Statute. For a discussion of
the role of the Court in the United Nations system, see S. RosENNE, supra note 9, at
63-100.
151. SWA Cases 1966, at 31, 44-45, 46-47, 50.
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the United Nations at the time of its deliberations on termination of the
mandate compatible with the mandates system, the Charter and the
Statute of the Court was to request the Court to issue an advisory opin-
ion on (a) the compatibility of Apartheid with South Africa's obligations
under the mandate; and (b) the authority of the United Nations to
unilaterally revoke the mandate in the event of finding by the Court
that South Africa had violated its obligations. An opinion favorable
to the United Nations, it is submitted, would have given the organization
a sound juridical basis for termination of the mandate.
It has been contended elsewhere that, although the General Assembly
was entitled to seek an advisory opinion from the Court on the com-
patibility of Apartheid with obligations under the mandate, it might have
bypassed the Court and still validly revoked the mandate.152 In support
of this position it has been argued: (1) the Court could have declined to
give such an opinion on the ground of the rule set forth in the Eastern
Carelia case that an advisory opinion should not be issued regarding a
situation involving an actual dispute between states; (2) advisory opinions
are not binding-South Africa had refused to accept three previous opin-
ions on strictly legal points, so it was reasonable for the Assembly to
assume that South Africa would likewise not accept one of a politico-legal
nature advising that Apartheid failed to promote the welfare of the in-
habitants of Namibia; and (3) the Assembly already had substantial judi-
cial assistance to guide it in its deliberations because five of the six judges
who considered the issue in 1966 found Apartheid incompatible with
South Africa's obligations under the mandate.15
What these arguments boil down to is that the Court might not give an
opinion, or South Africa might ignore it, and, in any event, the conclu-
sion of such an opinion was a certainty. None of these, however, is an
excuse for dispensing with a judicial opinion when that opinion, struc-
turally, is a necessary basis for legislative action. Moreover, the premises
themselves are faulty. The Eastern Carelia opinion, issued by the Per-
manent Court of Justice, has been limited to its peculiar facts by the
International Court of Justice. 54 The Court in effect so indicated in
152. Dugard, supra note 136, at 79.
153. Id. at 82-83. Only the South African Judge ad hoc, Van Wyk, found Apartheid
compatible with the mandate. Judges Wellington Koo, Tanaka, Padilla Nervo, and
Forster, as well as Judge ad hoc Mbanefo found to the contrary.
154. See, e.g., Advisory Opinion on Interpretation of Peace Treaties with Bulgaria,
Hungary and Rumania, [1950] I.C.J. 65; 2 S. ROSENNE, supra note 9, at 709-11.
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issuing the instant opinion. As already noted, South Africa's probable
rejection of an advisory opinion finding that Apartheid was incompatible
with its obligations under the mandate would not in any way lessen the
significance of the opinion as a juridical foundation for the Assembly's
actions 55 and a negation of charges that it had proceeded in disregard
of the requirements of due process. Finally, individual opinions of judges
are no substitute for an opinion of the Court and cannot serve as an
authoritative guide for Assembly action.156
It is most unfortunate that the world community has to date been
deprived of an authoritative judicial determination of the compatibility
of Apartheid with South Africa's obligations under the mandate. Most
of the 1962-66 proceedings were devoted to hearing evidence on this
issue, but the Court never reached the merits in its decision. For its part,
the General Assembly, through its adoption of Resolution 2145(XXI),
made a determination that Apartheid violated the mandate, but it made
this determination without the benefit of a hearing or of judicial assis-
tance. In its advisory opinion of 1971, the Court states by way of dictum
that Apartheid violates the mandate, but no evidence was presented on
this point in the proceedings, and it was not an issue before the Court.
This is not to suggest that South Africa's claim that Apartheid is com-
patible with the mandate has any merit. It is to say that international
due process required a judicial determination on this issue based on a
fair hearing.' 57
155. In this connection, it is interesting to compare the United Nations response
to the Court's Advisory Opinion on Certain Expenses of the United Nations, [1962]
I.C.J. 151, where the Assembly "recognized its need for authoritative legal guidance'
and accepted the opinion of the Court. GA. Res. 1854 A (XVII), 17 U.N. GAOR 1193,
U.N. Doc. A/pv 1199 (1962). In the debates on the resolution France, the Soviet Union
and various communist countries argued against the Assembly's accepting the opinion
on the ground that, since it was not binding, Assembly acceptance would be tanta-mount to amending the Charter. Jordan proposed amending the draft 
so that the
Assembly would onIy 
"take note" of the Court's 
opinion. The Jordanian 
amendment
was defeated by a vote of 68 against, 28 
for and 14 abstentions. 17 U.N. GAOR, 
964th
meeting of the Fifth Comm., pala. 4.156. Some might argue that a return to 
the Court would not have been possible 
in
light of the strong reaction against the 
Court after its 1966 decision. Admittedy, 
tis
could not have been done until after the 
election of several new judges and the 
cool-
ing of passions. But the return to the Court in 1970 indicates 
that, with time, it
might have been possible to resubmit the issue of Apartheid's 
compatibility with the
mandacetIv
It might also be argued that resubmission 
of this issue to the Court would have re-
sulted in protracted proceedings similar 
to those conducted by te Court n the 
con-
tentions phase gf the case. However, the 
Court could have met e time ojecon 
y
basing its opinion primarily on the 
record of the earlier proceedings, which 
ex-
haustively considered the issue, and limiting new evidence to testimony 
as to changes
in Namibia since 1966.
157. It is noteworthy also that the Court 
rejected every claim of South Africa, often
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V
THE FUTURE OF NAMIBIA
A. IMPLICATIONS OF THE COURT'S OPINION:
ALTERNATIVES FOR RESPONSE
Whatever the merits of the Court's opinion, the salient fact is that the
Security Council now has an authoritative legal statement that South
Africa is in illegal occupation of Namibia and is under an obligation to
withdraw immediately. South Africa, on the other hand, has categorically
rejected the Court's opinion 5 8 and refuses to give up Namibia. South
Africa also continues to apply Apartheid to the territory and has taken
steps to establish bantustans or "homelands" along the lines of those in
South Africa. 159 The confrontation between the United Nations and
South Africa over Namibia thus continues with no apparent resolution
in sight. In light of this continued stalemate, perhaps the crucial ques-
tions at this juncture are: what courses of action are open to the United
Nations, and which would be most compatible, in the language of article
2 of the mandate, with the "material and moral well-being and the social
progress of the inhabitants of the territory?"
In response to the Court's opinion, the Security Council on October
21, 1971 adopted a resolution 60 which, inter alia, (1) recognizes "the
legitimacy of the movement of the people of Namibia against the illegal
occupation of their territory by the South African authorities and their
right to self-determination and independence," (2) agrees with the Court's
opinion that South Africa is under an obligation to withdraw its ad-
ministration from Namibia immediately, and (3) requests the Ad Hoc
Sub-Committee on Namibia "to study appropriate measures for the ful-
fillment of the responsibility of the United Nations towards Namibia."
Except for the reference to the Court's opinion, this resolution amounts
to little more than still another call upon South Africa to withdraw from
the territory, in the face of categorical statements by South Africa that it
will not do so.
in the most categorical and summary fashion. One may question whether the Court
was a bit "too avid" in this respect. See Gordon, Old Orthodoxies Amid New Experi-
ences: The South West Africa (Namibia) Litigation and the Uncertain Jurisprudence
of the International Court of Justice, I DEN. J. INT'L LAW AND POLICY 65, 91 (1971).
158. N.Y. Times, June 22, 1971, at 1, col. 6.
159. See, e.g., United Nations Council For Namibia, Report, 26 U.N. GAOR Supp.
24-27, U.N. Doc. A/8424 (1971).
160. Res. 301, 1598th meeting, U.N. Doc. S/Res/301 (Oct. 20, 1971).
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At the time of this writing,'61 the Security Council has further deter-
mined that South Africa's continued occupation of Namibia "creates
conditions detrimental to the maintenance of peace and security in the
region."'1 2 However, it appears that the Council is unwilling to take the
steps which follow inexorably from the logic of its conclusions. If South
Africa is actually in illegal occupation of Namibia, and South Africa in-
dicates dearly that it has no intention to withdraw from the territory, it
follows that there is a "threat to international peace and security" calling
for Chapter VII measures. Although the world community has never
been able to agree on a definition of aggression, there is unanimous agree-
ment that illegal occupation by one state of another state or territory is
a classic case of aggressive behavior 6 3 Indeed, if the situation in Rhodesia
constitutes a threat to the peace, it follows a fortiori that South Africa's
illegal occupation of Namibia must be similarly classified.
16
The reason for the failure of the Security Council to follow the logic
of its conclusions is of course simple: Great Britain, France and the
United States, among others, have made it clear that they will not support
application of Chapter VII measures against South Africa. Moreover, in
light of the United Nations' unhappy experience with sanctions against
Rhodesia, it is highly questionable whether economic sanctions against
South Africa would be in any way effective.' 65
It is time the world community recognized the realities of the situation
in Namibia. Under present circumstances South Africa is not going to
heed United Nations' demands that it withdraw from Namibia, and the
Security Council is not going to apply Chapter VII sanctions against
South Africa to enforce its demands. Is one then forced to conclude that
there is no way to avoid South Africa's annexation of the territory and
that until such time as Namibian liberation movements gain sufficient
161. March 20, 1972.
162. Res. 310, 1638th meeting, U.N. Doc. S/Res/310 (Feb. 4, 1972).
163. For a general survey of the problems of defining aggression, see Special Com-
mittee On The Question Of Defining Aggression, Report, U.N. Doc. A/AC 134/2 (1968),
revised ed. U.N. Doc. A/7185/Rev./1; and A/AC 134/5 (1969). See also Rosenstock, The
Declaration of Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations: A Sur-
vey, 65 Am. J. IrNr'r L. 713 (1971).
164. On the situation regarding Rhodesia, compare Acheson, The Arrogance of In-
ternational Lawyers, 2 INT'L LAW. 591 (1968) wzth McDougal & Reisman, Rhodesia
and the United Nations: The Lawfulness of International Concern, 62 AM. J. INT'L L.
1 (1968).
165. For studies of sanctions, see R. SEGA. (ed.), SANcrioNs AGAINST SouTH AnRcA
(1964) and A. LImss (ed.), APARTHEID AND THE UNITED NATIONS: COLLECTIVE MEASURES,
AN ANALYSIS (1965).
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strength to drive South Africa out of the territory, the people of Namibia
will be subjected to the evils of Apartheid? Is it correct to say that in
Namibia, ". . . the United Nations is faced with a choice-at least an
apparent choice-between peace and justice?"'100
Perhaps this Hobson's choice between peace and justice is more ap-
parent than real. It is true that the cynic could see, in Namibia, a fatal
blow to the international legal system as a means of resolving disputes
between nations. Certainly, the International Court of Justice's per-
formance has left something to be desired. But perhaps this was because
the parties directly concerned tried to resolve their differences by litiga-
tion and confrontation, rather than by searching for other approaches
of the international legal system that might prove more promising. Per-
haps the Namibian cases are an example of the international application
of elementary principles taught law students, namely, that litigation is
a last resort, and it is the good lawyer who keeps his client out of court.
In the final analysis, it may be that too much was asked of the system in
its present state of development. But even if that is so, must we abandon
it, or may there be alternative courses of action which might utilize in-
ternational law and procedures more effectively?
A first step might be to heed the suggestion of the British representative
to the Security Council ". . . that it is by dialogue rather than by con-
frontation that progress can be made. . .. -167 In this connection, it is
encouraging to note that, pursuant to Security Council Resolution 309,108
Secretary-General Waldheim has initiated discussions with South Africa
over Namibia and South Africa has indicated its willingness to accept a
special United Nations representative to consult with South Africa con-
166. See Landis, supra note 11, at 671.
167. 26 U.N. SCOR, 1589th meeting, U.N. Doc. s/pv 1589 at 32 (October 6, 1971).
168. S.C. Res. 309, 1638th meeting, U.N. Doc. S. Res. 309 (Feb. 4, 1972). Resolution
309 provides in operative part:
"The Security Council,
1. Invites the Secretary-General, in consultation and close cooperation with
a group of the Security Council, composed of the representatives of Argen-
tina, Somalia and Yugoslavia, to initiate as soon as possible contacts with all
parties concerned, with a view to establishing the necessary conditions so as
to enable the people of Namibia, freely and with strict regard to the prin-
ciples of human equality, to exercise their right to self-determination and
independence, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations;
2. Calls on the Government of South Africa to co-operate fully with the
Secretary-General in the implementation of this resolution;
3. Requests the Secretary-General to report to the Security Council on the
implementation of this resolution not later than 31 July 1972."
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cerning the future of Namibia. 169 At the same time, one wonders how
meaningful any dialogue between the United Nations and South Africa
will be if both parties maintain their present positions, i.e., the United
Nations continues to demand that South Africa withdraw immediately
from Namibia in the face of South Africa's adamant refusal to do so.' 7 0
What steps might be taken to allow a meaningful dialogue to begin?
First, it must be realized that South Africa has certain legitimate in-
terests in the disposition of Namibia, but these do not include the per-
petuation of a system of racial discrimination and oppression such as
Apartheid. However, South Africa is understandably concerned with its
own territorial security in the light of the exceedingly hostile attitude
toward it of most other African states. A hostile government in power in
Namibia might allow the territory to be used as a base for guerrilla in-
cursions into South Africa.
17 '
Another legitimate interest of South Africa is the welfare of the ap-
proximately 90,000 white inhabitants' 72 of Namibia under a new govern-
ment controlled by non-whites. There is substantial sentiment in the
United Nations that administration of the territory by the organization
should be only for a brief transitional period before independence, 7 3
Indeed, the United Nations has neither the financial base nor the tech-
nical competence to administer the territory for more than such a period.
This procedure, however, would not allow sufficient time for working out
arrangements for a smooth transition from mandate status to self-govern-
ment, and South Africa and the white inhabitants of Namibia are dearly
determined to prevent what they regard as precipitous independence and
self-government for Namibia. What alternative administrative arrange-
ments, if any, might be available to break this deadlock?
Given a measure of flexibility by both sides, it might be possible for
the United Nations and South Africa to agree on an arrangement
169. N.Y. Times, July 21, 1972, at 2, col. 3.
On September 25, 1972, Secretary-General Waldheim appointed Alfred M. Escher, a
retired Swiss diplomat, as his special representative. South Africa has refused to allow
Mr. Escher to open an office in Namibia. But, after six months of private negotiations,
Mr. Waldheim has announced that South Africa agreed to permit his representative
to make visits to the territory. N.Y. Times, September 26, 1972, at 6, col. 1.
170. At the end of his preliminary talks with South Africa on Namibia, Secretary-
General Waldheim was reported as acknowledging the "deep gulf" between the United
Nations position and that of South Africa. N.Y. Times, March 11, 1972, at 2, col. 3,
171. See United Nations Council For Namibia, Report, supra note 165, at 22 for a
discussion of the activities of the "liberation movement" in Namibia.
172. NY. Times, June 9, 1971, at 10, col. 1.
173. See e.g., United Nations Council For Namibia, Report, supra note 165, at 32.
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whereby South Africa would continue to administer Namibia, but with
the understanding that it would do so under United Nations supervision.
The goal of such an arrangement would be to enable inhabitants of the
territory, at the earliest possible date, to reach a level of self-government
sufficient to enable them to exercise the right of self-determination-
whether that exercise should result in a choice for independence or for
incorporation into South Africa. It would also be necessary for South
Africa to agree to easing and gradually eliminating Apartheid practices
in the territory.
Although South Africa has consistently refused to submit to United
Nations supervision of its activities in Namibia, and has strongly de-
fended its Apartheid practices, it might be willing to change its position
in exchange for meaningful guarantees for its own territorial security and
the interests of the white inhabitants of Namibia. The problem of South
Africa's territorial security would arise only if the people of Namibia
eventually opted for independence as opposed to incorporation into
South Africa. In that event, before agreeing to independence for Namibia,
South Africa would require guarantees that the new state would not pose
a threat to South Africa and assurances that the lives and property of the
white population in Namibia would be protected. For its part, Namibia
would wish to ensure freedom of its territory from South African en-
croachment, and full participation in the economic, social, and political
life of the country by its non-white population.
A possible solution to the problem of South Africa's and Namibia's
territorial security would be to establish Namibia, as a concomitant of
its independence, as a permanently neutralized state along the lines of
Switzerland.174 Neutralization of Namibia might serve the primary objec-
tive of neutralization in international law, that is, managing, if not en-
tirely avoiding, conflict through the creation of "buffer states" in order
to stabilize balance-of-power rivalries and/or remove a state as a focal
point of international conflict. 7 5 A neutralized Namibia might be re-
garded as a "buffer state" between South Africa and antagonistic guerrilla
groups in Angola and Rhodesia, and it would dearly be less of a focal
point of international conflict.
174. The following discussion of neutralization is taken in large part from Murphy,
Neutralization of Israel, 65 AM. J. INT'L L. 167 (1971).
175. See generally, BLACK, FALK, KNORR &c YOUNG, NEUTRALIZATION AND WORLD POLI-
TIcs (1968); 1 M WHrraMAN, supra note 140, at 342-64 (1963); Kunz, Austria's Perma-
nent Neutrality, 50 Am. J. INT'l. L. 418 (1956).
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Neutralization, as distinguished from a policy of neutrality, can be
brought about only by treaty and not by unilateral declaration. 176 Under
present international law and practice, the procedure would be to con-
clude a treaty of neutralization between Namibia and other interested
states or entities with Namibia's consent. It is no longer supportable for
the great powers, by treaty among themselves, to impose the status of
neutralization upon weaker states, as the European Powers did in the
nineteenth century with regard to Belgium and Luxembourg.
The parties to a treaty neutralizing Namibia would at a minimum
have to include Namibia, South Africa and the United Nations, i.e., the
primary protagonists in the conflict over Namibia. It might also be de-
sirable, and perhaps indispensable, to include the United Kingdom,
France, and the United States, because of the role they might play in
maintaining and guaranteeing the neutralization of Namibia.
As a neutralized state, Namibia would be required to abstain from
going to war except in self-defense, and to avoid policies and actions that
might involve it in hostilities.177 If a war or armed conflict were to break
out between other states, Namibia would be required to remain neutral
in the strict, classic sense.' 78
At the same time, neutralization does not necessarily mean demilitariza-
tion. On the contrary, the neutralized state not only has a right, but an
obligation, to defend its neutrality, by armed force if necessary. Most
important for the present discussion, Namibia would be under an obliga-
tion to prevent use of its territory as a base for hostile incursions into
176. A distinction is usually drawn between "neutralization" and "neutrality." Neu-
trality is defined as a voluntary policy that a state may adopt in time of war with
respect to belligerents. Neutralization, on the other hand, refers to a permanent
status, acquired by agreement with other states, which cannot be relinquished without
their consent. "Permanent neutrality" is often used in the same sense as neutralization.
See 1 M. WHrrmrN, supra note 140, at 342-43.
Arguably, Austria should be classified as an example of neutrality instead of neu-
tralization because the State Treaty with Austria contains no reference to Austria's
neutralization. Rather, the terms of Austria's neutralization are found in a Constitu-
tional Federal Statute enacted by the Austrian Parliament. It has been contended,
however, that the Austrian statute is more than a unilateral declaration of policy be-
cause (a) it was enacted pursuant to an international obligation, the so-called Moscow
Memorandum of April 15, 1955, between Austria and the Soviet Union, and (b) the
neutralization of Austria has been generally recognized by member states of the in-
ternational community. See Kunz, supra note 175, at 419-22.
177. E.g., adherence to a treaty entailing a political commitment, especially a de-
fensive alliance, a treaty of guarantee, or a collective security arrangement.
178. As a neutral, its duties would include refraining from joining an international
military action, whether it be under the aegis of the United Nations or any other
international organization, and from allowing passage of troops of a belligerent
through, or the flying of a belligerent's planes over, its territory.
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South Africa. For its part, South Africa would be under an obligation to
refrain from any acts incompatible with Namibia's neutral status.
It would be imperative that the other parties to the treaty be required
to guarantee the neutralization of Namibia as well as to recognize it,17 9
A state simply recognizing the neutrality of another country is only
obliged to refrain from taking any action that might violate that neu-
trality. Only a guarantee of the neutralization of a state gives rise to an
obligation to defend it. Such a guarantee can be given by states severally
or collectively.18 0 If it is collective, the guarantors must act as a body; but
if the guarantee is given by states severally, each state is under a duty to
act in a way which is peculiar to it. In view of the unhappy historical
experience with unanimity voting requirements, it is likely that both
Namibia and South Africa would insist that the guarantee be several
or collective and several. In particular, South Africa would probably re-
quire substantial assurances that friendly powers such as the United
States, the United Kingdom and France would be under an obligation
to guarantee Namibia's neutrality and thereby South Africa's territorial
security.
How might neutralization of Namibia be supervised? Until the three-
member Commission for Supervision and Control of Laos, established
under the Geneva Agreement of 1954, was assigned the task of enforcing
the neutralization of Laos, there was no provision in international law or
practice to ensure the maintenance of a treaty of neutralization. That
Commission, however, has proven ineffective in controlling repeated in-
terventions by several guarantor states, largely because of a lack of access
to parts of the country controlled by Communist forces, dissension among
the members of the Commission, and the unanimity requirement for
determining whether a violation of the agreements occurred. Moreover,
as an instrument of the guarantor states, the Commission has not been
able to play an independent role in determining whether these states
are fulfilling their obligations.181
Namibia and South Africa would surely demand a more impartial com-
mission with more effective powers. To ensure impartiality, such a com-
mission might be established under United Nations auspices with
179. See 1 M. WHIrTMAN, supra note 140, at 850.
180. 1 L. OPPENHEIM, INTETU4TONAL LAW 966.67 (8th ed. H. Lauterpacht, 1955),
181. See A. IOMEN, CONFLICT IN .I.,Aos: THE POLITICS OF N EUTRIZA'nON 247-50
(1964) for a discussion of the failure of the Commission to control the conflict.
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members selected from states not parties to the treaty of neutralization.
If a majority of commission members determined that there had been a
possible violation of the treaty, the commission would then investigate
the situation. Namibia and the other parties to the treaty would be under
an obligation to provide the commission with the resources and authority
necessary to carry out its duties. In particular, the commission would
have to be granted free access to all parts of the territory of Namibia, as
well as adequate transportation and communication facilities.
The United Nations experience with peacekeeping operations and the
experience in Laos indicate that the parties would be unlikely to agree
that the commission itself should have power to decide whether a viola-
tion of the treaty had occurred. Rather, the functions of the commission
would probably be limited to observation, fact-finding, and the submis-
sion of reports to a plenary meeting of the parties or to the United Na-
tions for further action. In any case, some provision should be made for
finally determining whether a violation of the treaty has occurred, and
this decision should be made by a majority, or perhaps a two-thirds, vote
not subject to veto. Provision should also be made for some enforcement
mechanism in the event a violation is found.
Any treaty of neutralization for Namibia must also provide for periodic
review of its provisions, and meetings to consider revisions, in the treaty
should be called within a certain period after the receipt of a request for
such a meeting from any party to the treaty. However, modification or
abolition of the status of neutralization should be precluded except with
the consent of all parties to the treaty, including Namibia.
B. TOWARD A MULTIRACIAL SOCIETY IN NAMIBIA
In addition to guarantees of the territorial inviolability of Namibia
and South Africa, the elimination of Apartheid practices, and measures
to protect the lives and property of the white population in the territory
would be indispensable conditions of an agreement among South Africa,
the United Nations and other interested parties on continued South Afri-
can administration of Namibia. It seems unlikely that agreement could
be reached at this time on the precise details of, or a timetable for, the
elimination of Apartheid in Namibia. However, it might be feasible to
reach agreement in principle on the eventual elimination of Apartheid
in Namibia, and on first steps to this end, in exchange for effective se-
curity guarantees for South African territory and the lives and property
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of whites in Namibia. The details and timetable of the Apartheid elimi-
nation program would be the subject of continuing negotiations. Disa-
greements among the parties on details and timetable might be resolved
by reference to third party arbitration procedures.
What steps might South Africa initially take regarding the elimination
of Apartheid in Namibia? Perhaps the problem could be approached in
two basic stages. First, South Africa could move toward greater economic
equality and opportunity. Measures to this end might include recognition
and encouragement of black trade union activity; payment of equal wages
and wages reflecting reasonable rates for the job; equal access to promo-
tion and training facilities; full and equal provision for health, insurance,
transport, housing, and benefits and services to both employees and de-
pendents; and, the nullification of laws designating particular jobs for
whites and blacks.'
8 2
In the second stage, South Africa would abrogate restrictions upon
the individual liberties of non-whites, such as the Suppression of Com-
munism Act, the Ninety Day Detention Law, the 180-Day Detention Law,
the Terrorism Act, and the forced resettlements of non-whites in ban-
tustans, and area restrictions. 8 All of these measures, and others, are
presently intended to safeguard the security of the white population in
Namibia by maintaining absolute control over the movements and con-
centration of the non-white population. 8 4
Some might argue that, even if agreement could be reached on the
present status and procedures for future disposition of Namibia, any
arrangement enhancing the territorial security of South Africa, and
hence maintaining Apartheid practices there, is unacceptable. This ar-
gument misses the mark. The point is that successful modification and
at least partial elimination of Apartheid in Namibia may induce South
Africa to reconsider its own internal practices. The situation in Namibia
182. See Curtis, South Africa: The Politics of Fragmentation, 50 FoRraGN ArF. 282
(1972). Thus, for example, South Africa might agree to discontinue practices in the
civil service field limiting participation by "natives" to the lowest and least-skilled
categories, such as messengers and cleaners. Similarly, in the mining industry South
Africa might cease excluding "natives" from such occupations as prospector for pre-
cious and base minerals, dealer in unwrought precious metals, manager, assistant
manager or sectional manager and lift "ceilings" presently placed on the promotion
of the "natives." Other practices which might be eliminated at an early date would
include confinement of "natives" to unskilled labor in the fishing industr and reser-
vation of all graded posts in the Railways and Harbour's 
Administratin to "Eu-
ropeans." See Dissenting Opinion of Judge Tanaka, SWA Cases 1966, at 311-13.
183. For a general discussion of this legislation, see Comment, supra note 20.
184. See United Nations Council For Namibia, Report, supra note 159, at 24-27.
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might be regarded as an experiment in multiracial living in Southern
Africa. Should such an experiment prove successful, the more enlightened
and moderate elements in South Africa might be greatly strengthened
and encouraged to push for similar reforms in South Africa itself. In
any event, it is hard to resist the conclusion that half a loaf (Namibia) is
better than none.
It might also be contended that instant elimination of Apartheid in
Namibia and immediate independence are the only solutions acceptable
under the Charter and the General Assembly Declaration on the Granting
of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples. 8 5 In light of the un-
derdeveloped nature of the territory, the desirability of immediate inde-
pendence for Namibia is debatable. At any rate, present South African and
white Namibian attitudes preclude either immediate independence for
Namibia or instant elimination of Apartheid as possibilities. The United
Nations is not negotiating from a position of strength, and the realities
of the situation demand some accommodation with South Africa if any
reforms in Namibia are to be effected or if bloodshed in the territory is
to be voided. Because of its position of strength, South Africa may choose
to be totally unyielding and insist on administering Namibia without
outside interference. If so, the blame for failure to take any steps toward
resolution of the dispute or for any resulting violence in the area may be
placed squarely on South Africa. However, it is incumbent upon the
United Nations and the world community-particularly the Great Powers
-to explore all possibilities of resolving the problem without violence.
Any other course of action is incompatible with United Nations responsi-
bilities for maintaining international peace and security and promoting
respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peo-
ples. 8
0
185. 15 U.N. GAOR Supp. 16, at 66, U.N. Doc A/4684 (1960).
186. See U.N. CArTm art. 1, paras. 1, 2.
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